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Much has been written about procedures and remedies under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, but few scholars have 
explored procedural rights and corresponding mechanisms of 
administrative and judicial relief for victims of public schools’ 
violations of children’s rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 and title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  This 
paper will discuss the administrative procedures that must be 
followed in hearings regarding complaints of violations of those laws 
by public school districts and the relief that hearing officers and 
courts may provide.  It will begin with an update on developments 
regarding eligibility and substantive protections under section 504 
and title II, then take up administrative process matters, including 
hearing officer impartiality, demands to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses, and judicial review of administrative decisions.  Finally, it 
will consider remedies that may be ordered by hearing officers and 
courts.  This paper builds on the earlier research of the author and of 
other writers, who have developed theories about how section 504 
and title II should be applied to students in public elementary and 
secondary schools.  Recent developments, most significantly the ADA 
Amendments Act and the Mark H. litigation in the Ninth Circuit, will 
have a major effect on section 504 and title II cases.  However, the 
Amendments Act and the Mark H. decisions are merely the starting 
point for a new area of legal development that may have great 
significance for the administrative law judiciary. 
 
 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 and title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 protect public school 
                                                          
* Vincent dePaul Professor of Law, DePaul University.  B.A. Columbia, 
J.D. Yale.  Many thanks to my co-panelist, Robert Garda, and to all who organized 
and participated in the Special Education Law Symposium at Pepperdine 
University School of Law.  Special thanks to my research assistants, Elizabeth 
Powell and Rachel Milos.  © Mark C. Weber 2012. 
 
1 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).  The law protects otherwise qualified 
individuals with a disability against exclusion from participation in, denial of 
benefits of, and discrimination under, programs or activities receiving federal 
financial assistance.  Id.  
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12150 (2006).  The law protects qualified 
individuals with a disability against exclusion from participation in, denial of 
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children who have disabilities.  To obtain remedies under those laws, 
however, children and their parents frequently must resort to hearing 
procedures before members of the administrative law judiciary.  
Much has been written about procedures and remedies under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).3  But little has 
been written about procedures and remedies under section 504 and 
the ADA,4 leaving the scholarship in the area underdeveloped.5  This 
                                                          
benefits of, and discrimination under, services, programs, or activities of state and 
local government.  Id. § 12132. 
3 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006).  A sampling of recent work on IDEA 
procedures and remedies includes:  Sonja Kerr, Mediation of Special Education 
Disputes in Pennsylvania, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 179 (2012); Eloise 
Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413 (2011); Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: 
Structural Due Process in Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 
(2011); Mark C. Weber, Settling Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Cases: 
Making Up Is Hard to Do, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 641 (2010); Perry A. Zirkel, Case 
Law for Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An 
Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175 (2011); T. Daris Isbell, Note, 
Distinguishing Between Compensatory Education and Additional Services as 
Remedies Under the IDEA, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1717 (2011); Natalie Pyong 
Kocher, Note, Lost in Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA’s Inherent Paradox, 21 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 333 (2010); Brianna L. Lennon, Note, Cut and Run? 
Tuition Reimbursement and the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 75 MO. L. REV. 1297 
(2010).  
4 Damages remedies under section 504 and the ADA have received some 
development.  See, e.g., Sarah Poston, Developments in Federal Disability 
Discrimination Law: An Emerging Resolution to the Section 504 Damages Issue, 
1992–93 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 419 (1994); Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroads of 
Title IX and a New “IDEA”: Why Bullying Need Not Be “a Normal Part of 
Growing Up” for Special Education Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 
31 (2005) (discussing redress for bullying under section 504 and the ADA); Mark 
C. Weber, Damages Liability in Special Education Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 83 
(2002).  Of the remaining commentary, much concerns eligibility for and 
accommodations in athletics.  See, e.g., James P. Looby, Reasonable 
Accommodations for High School Athletes with Disabilities: Preserving Sports 
While Providing Access for All, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 227 (2012); Tessie E. Rose & 
Dixie Snow Huefner, High School Athletic Age-Restriction Rules Continue to 
Discriminate Against Students with Disabilities, 196 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 385 
(2005); Kimberly M. Brown, Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: A 
Commentary on the Impact of High School Athletic Eligibility Requirements on 
Students with Learning Disabilities, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
255 (2008) Brooke A. Fredrickson, Note, The Age Nineteen Rule and Students with 
Disabilities: Discrimination Against Disabled Students with Athletic Ability, 25 T. 
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article seeks to close the gap in the commentary and contribute to the 
scholarly dialogue on procedural and remedial issues in cases 
involving public schoolchildren who are making claims that their 
rights under section 504 and the ADA have been violated. 
It is an apt time for this dialogue to take place.  Although 
school districts are growing progressively more resistant to 
identifying children as entitled to the protections of IDEA,6 Congress 
has recently extended the coverage of section 504 and the ADA to 
large numbers of children through the redefinition of “individuals 
with disabilities” in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, effective 
January 1, 2009.7  The ADA Amendments Act overturns Supreme 
Court precedent that had narrowed the coverage of the ADA and 
section 504, provides that impairments are to be considered in their 
unmitigated state when determining if an individual has a disability, 
and greatly expands the definition of major life activities provided in 
the statute’s coverage provision.8  In the past, section 504 and the 
ADA have typically been used as supplemental causes of action in 
cases involving children in the public schools, frequently being 
                                                          
JEFFERSON L. REV. 635 (2003). 
5 Professor Zirkel’s work is a notable exception, and will be discussed at 
various points in this Article.  An article of mine that takes up the issues in brief 
following a longer discussion of substantive entitlements under the two statutes is 
Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education 
Cases, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2010). 
6 Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 102–
22 (2009); see Anello v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 355 F. App’x 594 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(upholding summary judgment in favor of school district on claim that child should 
have been found IDEA-eligible earlier, noting child’s success under section 504 
plan); Brado v. Weast, No. CIV. PJM 07-2696, 2010 WL 333760 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 
2010) (holding that child with section 504 plan was not eligible under IDEA); A.J. 
v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding child with 
Asperger’s syndrome ineligible on ground that academic performance was 
satisfactory); Chase v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, No. CIV.A. 
07-CV-00205RE, 2009 WL 3013752 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2009) (holding that child 
maintaining average grades was properly terminated from special education); E.M. 
v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 06-4694 JF, 2009 WL 2766704 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding child continually at risk of grade retention not eligible 
on basis of learning disability). 
7 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(amended 2008) [hereinafter ADA Amendments Act]. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 21–35 (describing expansion of 
coverage of ADA in ADA Amendments Act). 
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asserted when a student who is eligible for services under IDEA 
wants compensatory damages relief.9  In addition, in the words of 
Professor Zirkel, “Section 504 is often used as a consolation prize in 
the wake of a determination of non-eligibility for an IEP 
[individualized education program] under the IDEA.”10  As the 
“consolation prize” becomes the prize itself, the rules and object of 
the contest will become progressively more important. 
Upon analyzing the relevant statutory and regulatory 
provisions, this Article will conclude that section 504 and the ADA 
require school districts to afford significant procedural protections to 
students with disabilities, and that hearing officers and courts may 
award a wide range of remedies in section 504 and ADA cases.  The 
text of the applicable section 504 regulation affords the basic right to 
a hearing; due process principles provide support for the implication 
of specific rights regarding impartiality, examination of witnesses, 
and other topics, even if the procedural protections are not all that 
parties might desire.  Remedies in section 504 and ADA cases 
include compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees, although hearing 
officers may not be able to award them under state law and practice; 
courts will need to provide these remedies in follow-up litigation.  
Other remedies should be freely available through the administrative 
hearing process, such as orders for future conduct, tuition 
reimbursement, records amendments, and additional equitable relief.  
Recent developments, including the ADA Amendments Act and the 
Mark H. litigation in the Ninth Circuit,11 significantly affect section 
504 and title II rights.  However, the Amendments Act and the Mark 
H. decisions are merely the starting point for a new area of legal 
development that may have great significance for the work of the 
administrative law judiciary. 
Parts I and II of this Article provide background by describing 
and updating the law pertaining to coverage of public school children 
under section 504 and the ADA (Part I) and entitlements under the 
two statutes (Part II).  Part II will place emphasis on the right to 
                                                          
9 See infra text accompanying notes 172–183 (discussing damages relief 
under section 504 and ADA). 
10 Perry A. Zirkel, Does Section 504 Require a Section 504 Plan for Each 
Eligible Non-IDEA Student?, 40 J. L. & EDUC. 407, 414 (2011). 
11 Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008), appeal after 
remand, Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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services that meet the needs of children with disabilities as 
adequately as the needs of other children are met.  Part III discusses 
procedures at length, considering service plans, hearing officer 
impartiality, examination of witnesses at hearing, and judicial review.  
Part IV takes up remedies, including compensatory damages, tuition 
reimbursement and orders for future conduct, and attorneys’ and 
expert witness fees. 
 
I.  COVERAGE OF CHILDREN UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE ADA 
 
Under section 504 and the ADA, disability is defined as a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities of an individual, a record of such an 
impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.12  More 
than a decade ago, the Supreme Court held that this definition should 
be read narrowly13 and that impairments must be evaluated in their 
mitigated state, only after considering any medical intervention or 
other mechanisms, including those of the body’s own systems,14 that 
the individual applies to reduce the effect of the impairments.15  It 
held that the “regarded as” provision applies only if an employer or 
entity subject to the ADA incorrectly believes that a person has a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities or erroneously believes that an actual impairment 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.16  According to 
the Court, to be substantially limited in the major life activity of 
performing manual tasks, an individual had to be prevented or 
severely restricted “from doing activities that are of central 
                                                          
12 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9)(B) (West 2012), 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (2012) 
(section 504); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2012) (ADA). 
13 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[T]hese [definitional] terms need to be interpreted strictly to 
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled . . . .”).  
14 An example would be the unconscious correction that the brain makes 
when a person has unequal vision in the two eyes.  See Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999). 
15 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded 
by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008). 
16 Id. at 489. 
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importance to most people’s daily lives” and the restriction had to be 
“permanent or long term.”17  Other courts adopted further restrictive 
readings of the definitional provisions.18  Commentators complained 
that the interpretations of the ambiguous definitional terms 
contradicted the ADA’s legislative history19 and that the Court’s 
approach created a dilemma for claimants: the more a person did to 
minimize the effects of an impairment and become better able to 
perform a job, to use government services, or to take advantage of 
public accommodations, the more likely the person was to be 
excluded from the protections of the Act.20 
The ADA Amendments Act, passed in 2008 and effective on 
January 1, 2009, changes the definitional terms of the ADA and 
section 504.21  It explicitly disapproves the major Supreme Court 
cases that limited the coverage of the ADA and section 504.22  It 
declares that the definition of disability “shall be construed in favor 
of broad coverage of individuals,”23 and that the intent of Congress is 
“that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA 
should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied 
with their obligations,” rather than whether an impairment meets the 
definition of a disability.24  Making the legislative disapproval of the 
Supreme Court’s views more concrete, the statute provides: “An 
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active,”25 and the 
determination whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
                                                          
17 Williams, 534 U.S. at 198. 
18 See Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 994–95 (2008) (collecting 
authorities); Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, 85 IND. L. J. 187, 200–01 (2010) (collecting additional authorities). 
19 See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: 
Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 53, 54 (2000). 
20 See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of 
Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 342 
(2000). 
21 ADA Amendments Act, supra note 7. 
22 Id. § 2(b)(2)–(5). 
23 Id. § 4(a) (adding ADA § 3(4)(A)). 
24 Id. § 2(b)(5). 
25 Id. § 4(a) (adding ADA § 3(4)(D)). 
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activity is to be made “without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures,”26 apart for ordinary eyeglasses or contact 
lenses.27  Examples of mitigating measures to be disregarded are 
medication, hearing aids, cochlear implants, mobility devices, 
assistive technology, “reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids 
or services,” as well as “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological 
modifications.”28 
The Amendments Act sets out a nonexclusive list of major 
life activities drawn from examples previously found in regulations 
promulgated under the ADA, but expanded to include sleeping, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, plus 
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, walking, speaking, 
learning, and working.29  The term “major life activities” is further 
defined to cover operation of major bodily functions, such as 
“functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, 
bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, 
endocrine, and reproductive functions.”30  A person meets the 
definition of being regarded as having an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity if the person establishes that 
he or she has been subjected to a prohibited action “because of an 
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”31 
The definitional changes in the Amendments Act dramatically 
expand the coverage of the ADA and section 504 with respect to 
elementary and secondary students.  Children who achieve an 
adequate level of educational performance, but who need medical 
and other therapies or supplemental devices, aids, or services as they 
do so, are now covered by section 504 and the ADA, as long as their 
                                                          
26 ADA Amendments Act, supra note 7, at § 4(a) (adding ADA § 
3(4)(E)(i)). 
27 Id. (adding ADA § 3(4)(E)(ii)).  Low-vision devices do not count as 
ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses. § 3(4)(E)(i)(I). 
28 Id. (adding ADA § 3(4)(E)(i)(III), (IV)). 
29 Id. (adding § 3(2)(A)). 
30 Id. (adding § 3(2)(B)). 
31 ADA Amendments Act, supra note 7, at § 4(a) (adding ADA § 3(3)(A)).  
This provision does not apply if the impairment is “transitory and minor”; “[a] 
transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 
months or less” under the ADA’s new § 3(3)(B). 
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impairments would substantially limit a major life activity if the 
impairments were not mitigated.32  The list of major life activities 
now explicitly includes several activities that are closely tied into 
education: reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, as 
well as hearing, speaking, and learning.33  The “operation of a major 
bodily function” provision expands the law’s coverage to many 
children with serious medical conditions even if the conditions are 
satisfactorily treated.34  The bar for what is embraced by the term 
“substantially limits” is now much lower as well.35 
IDEA’s more restrictive coverage provisions remain 
unchanged, so the Amendments Act creates the likelihood there will 
be a large class of children eligible under the ADA and section 504 
who are not covered by IDEA.  Though eligibility of a child under 
IDEA may not automatically establish coverage under section 504 
and the ADA, non-coverage under section 504 and the ADA of a 
child covered under IDEA is exceedingly unlikely.  To be eligible 
under IDEA, a child must have one or more specified conditions, any 
of which constitutes a physical or mental impairment within the 
meaning of section 504 and the ADA.36  For all but specific learning 
disabilities, for which the requirement seems to be implied, the 
impairment has to adversely affect educational performance; for all 
impairments, the condition must cause a need for special education 
and related services.37  An adverse effect on educational performance 
appears to be the same thing as a limit on the major life activity of 
learning.38  And if the adverse effect is so great that it causes the 
                                                          
32 Id. (adding ADA § 3(4)(E)). 
33 Id. (adding ADA § 3(2)(A)). 
34 Id (adding ADA § 3(2)(B)). 
35 Id. § 2(a)(7)-(8), (b)(4)–(6). 
36 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West 2012) (“intellectual disabilities, 
hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual 
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific 
learning disabilities”).  The test for children aged three to nine is less specific.  Id. § 
1401(3)(B)(i). 
37 Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2012). 
38 Some states have adopted rules demanding that there be a significant 
adverse effect on the child’s educational performance for the child to be eligible 
under IDEA.  See, e.g., J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(applying Vermont provision requiring functioning significantly below expected 
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child to need special education and related services, it would 
constitute a substantial limit either on learning or on another major 
life activity such as reading, concentrating, hearing, speaking, 
thinking, or communicating, at least if the impairment is evaluated in 
its unmitigated state.  Hence the child would be covered under 
section 504 and the ADA. 
 
II.  ENTITLEMENTS UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE ADA 
 
Other writing of mine discusses the obligations of school 
districts and correlative entitlements of public school children under 
section 504 and the ADA. 39  A brief recapitulation of that topic may 
help to set the stage for the discussion of procedures and remedies, 
and it will provide an occasion to consider a few new authorities and 
clear the underbrush of some old ones.  The current discussion 
comprises a description of authorities establishing the section 504 
requirement of meeting the needs of children with disabilities as 
adequately as the needs of other children are met, then a critical 
examination of cases equating the section 504-ADA standard with 
that applied in IDEA disputes, and finally, consideration of cases that 
require plaintiffs in section 504-ADA actions to show intentional 
conduct on the part of defendants. 
 
A.   Meeting Needs as Adequately as Needs of Others Are Met 
 
Title II of the ADA contains a broad prohibition on disability 
discrimination,40 a provision stating that the remedies, procedures, 
and rights under the title are to be those that relate to section 504,41 
and a delegation of regulatory authority to the Attorney General with 
a directive to make the regulations consistent with those promulgated 
under section 504.42  The Attorney General’s regulations forbid 
                                                          
age or grade norms).  In my view, these standards imposing restrictions beyond 
what is in IDEA violate the federal statute.  See Weber, supra note 6, at 118–19.  
Nevertheless, where a child meets such an enhanced standard, the conclusion that 
there is coverage under section 504 and ADA coverage seems certain. 
39 See Weber, supra note 5, at 9–21. 
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 2012). 
41 Id. § 12133. 
42 Id. § 12134(a)–(b). 
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discrimination using broad language,43 and contain elaborate 
provisions regarding accessibility of facilities,44 but delegate to the 
Department of Education the responsibility for implementing 
compliance procedures relating to elementary and secondary 
education.45 
Regulations promulgated under section 504, which predate 
the ADA, require all recipients of federal funding that operate a 
public elementary or secondary education program to provide a free, 
appropriate public education to each child in the recipient’s 
jurisdiction covered by section 504.46  The section 504 regulations 
define appropriate education as “the provision of regular or special 
education and related aids and services that (i) are designed to meet 
individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as 
the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met and (ii) are based upon 
adherence to procedures that satisfy the requirements” of Department 
of Education regulations regarding educational setting, evaluation 
and placement, and procedural safeguards.47  The requirement of 
meeting needs as adequately as the needs of children without 
disabilities are met furnished the standard for appropriate education 
used by the lower courts in Board of Education v. Rowley.48  The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected that interpretation as going beyond 
the requirements of the statute that is now IDEA.49  The expansion of 
section 504-ADA coverage in the ADA Amendments Act, creating a 
conspicuous class of children covered by section 504 but not IDEA, 
has directed new attention to the as-adequately-met standard.50 
Earlier writing of mine on this topic discusses Mark H. v. 
Lemahieu
51
 and Lyons v. Smith,52 which both establish that the as-
                                                          
43 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2012). 
44 Id. §§ 35.150–.152. 
45 Id. § 35.190(b)(1). 
46 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2012).  The section 504 regulations also forbid 
unnecessary segregation, unjustified disparate-impact discrimination, refusal to 
furnish comparable academic and nonacademic facilities and settings, and failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation.  See id. §§ 104.4, 104.34. 
47 Id. § 104.33(b)(1). 
48 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
49 Id. at 198 n. 8. 
50 See Weber, supra note 5, at 3. 
51 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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adequately-met language of the regulation is to be given a 
straightforward reading.  Under those cases, the language entails 
comparing the depth and quality of services provided children 
without disabilities with those provided children with disabilities, and 
requires that the children with disabilities not come out on the short 
side of the comparison.53  Moreover, according to the Office for Civil 
Rights of the United States Department of Education, the section 504 
appropriate education duty does not incorporate a cost limit, as might 
be suggested by a “reasonable accommodation” standard, but instead 
such a limit applies only to post-secondary education.54 
Two more recent authorities merit discussion here.  One is 
Mark H. v. Hamamoto, the appeal after remand of Mark H. v. 
Lemahieu.55  In the Mark H. litigation, parents contended that their 
two daughters, both of whom had autistic conditions, were denied 
adequate services by the public schools in Hawaii for a protracted 
period of time.56  A hearing officer found that the children were 
denied appropriate education in violation of IDEA and ordered 
prospective relief.57  The parents then filed suit for damages, 
asserting that the failure to provide adequate services before the 
hearing and implementation of relief under IDEA constituted a 
violation of section 504.58  The district court granted summary 
judgment against the plaintiffs, holding that there is no section 504 
cause of action for violation of the right to appropriate education, and 
that IDEA is the exclusive avenue for claims that fall within its 
scope.59  In the Lemahieu decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court, ruling that IDEA is not an exclusive remedy60 and that 
the appropriate education duty under IDEA is not identical with that 
                                                          
52 829 F. Supp. 414, 419 (D. D.C. 1993). 
53 Weber, supra note 5, at 11–14. 
54 Letter to Zirkel, 20 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 134 
(1993). 
55 Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008), appeal after 
remand, Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010). 
56 See generally supra note 11. 
57 Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 928. 
58 Id. at 930. 
59 Id. at 931. 
60 Id. at 934–35. 
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under section 504.61  The court stated that the section 504 standard 
requires “a comparison between the manner in which the needs of 
disabled and non-disabled children are met . . . .”62  Because the 
parents, like the school system, incorrectly assumed that the 
standards were identical and that the failure to provide appropriate 
education under IDEA as identified by the hearing officer necessarily 
established any section 504 claim that might exist, the case had to be 
remanded for proceedings on whether the school system violated the 
section 504 standard.63  On remand, however, the district court again 
entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs.64 
In the Hamamoto decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed again 
and this time assigned the case to a different district judge.65  
According to the court, the plaintiffs’ damages claim rested on two 
violations of section 504: the defendants failed to provide the girls 
with reasonable accommodations for their disabilities through 
autism-specific special education services, and they failed to design 
the girls’ educational programs to meet their needs as adequately as 
the needs of students without disabilities were met.66  The court 
declared that the reasonable accommodation damages claim would 
succeed if “(1) the girls needed autism-specific services to enjoy 
meaningful access to the benefits of a public education, (2) 
[defendants were] on notice that the girls needed those autism-
specific services but did not provide those services, and (3) autism-
specific services were available as a reasonable accommodation.”67  
The court found that evidence in the record supported all of these 
propositions, as well as the allegation that the defendants acted with 
deliberate indifference.68 
On the damages claim for failure to meet the needs of the 
girls as adequately as those of others were met, the court said that the 
                                                          
61 Id. at 933. 
62 Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 933.  The court stated that the section 504 
regulation also requires a focus on the design of the child’s educational program, 
but did not elaborate on how this differs from IDEA.  Id. 
63 Id. at 939–40. 
64 Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).  
65 Id.at 1103. 
66 Id. at 1093. 
67 Id. at 1097. 
68 Id. at 1098–99. 
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parents alleged that the girls were unable to access any of the benefits 
of public education, and provided evidence that without access to 
autism-specific services, they received no meaningful access to 
education.69  The court stated: “Presumably, at a minimum, [the 
defendants’] education programs for its non-disabled students allow 
those students to access at least some benefits of a public 
education.”70  Denial of any benefits constituted denial of meaningful 
access, and the defendants’ knowledge of the as-adequately-met 
regulation and their failure to provide services they knew would 
likely be needed to satisfy the regulation would amount to deliberate 
indifference.71 
The Hamamoto opinion reaffirms the proposition that 
reasonable accommodations and as-adequately-met claims are 
available under section 504, and it establishes that denial of equally 
adequate services may constitute actionable denial of meaningful 
access.  But since the plaintiffs alleged denial of any benefit from the 
educational services offered the girls, the court did not have to flesh 
out the comparison between services received by children with 
disabilities and those without disabilities, nor determine when the 
imbalance is significant enough to amount to a failure of meaningful 
access.  Moreover, since the claims were for damages, the court did 
not discuss how much less plaintiffs need to plead and prove if all 
they seek is prospective relief.  The deliberate-indifference standard 
was minted for damages cases,72 and decisions in cases demanding 
other forms of relief have not required the showing.73 
A second case of note is M.M. v. Lafayette School District,74 
which involved a child with learning disabilities and claims that a 
school district failed to timely identify and evaluate the child and 
provide adequate services.  In considering a motion to dismiss the 
claim under section 504 for failure to meet the child’s educational 
needs as adequately as the needs of students without disabilities were 
                                                          
69 Hamamoto, 620 F.3d at 1098. 
70 Id. at 1101. 
71 Id. at 1101–02. 
72 See Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 938 (discussing mens rea in section 504 
cases). 
73 See, e.g., Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414 (D. D.C. 1993); see also 
cases cited infra note 185. 
74 No. C 10-04223 SI, 2011 WL 830261 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011). 
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met, the court, following Lemahieu, stated that plaintiffs who allege a 
violation of the section 504 appropriate education requirement must 
show something more than that the IDEA appropriate education 
requirements were not met.75  But the court said the plaintiffs were 
alleging more than denial of appropriate education under IDEA:  
 
[T]hey are alleging additionally that C.M.’s 
educational needs were not being met “as adequately 
as the educational needs of nondisabled students were 
met;” and that the district failed “to develop an IEP 
that included necessary accommodations to enable 
CM to access his education and participate in the 
general education curriculum at his ability level with 
his non-disabled peers.”76 
 
Since the claim went to the design of educational needs, the 
court allowed the case to proceed and granted the plaintiffs’ 
permission to amend their complaint to specify the needs not 
addressed, accommodations not provided, and regulations thus 
violated that would support a cause of action.77 
As with Hamamoto, the procedural posture of the case meant 
that there was no occasion to develop the as-adequately-met standard.  
But the court did establish that the standard requires no extraordinary 
showing: the as-adequately-met language is itself something more 
than the IDEA standard, and a claim may be asserted under it by 
identifying deficiencies in services and accommodations, which 
might then be the basis for the comparison with services provided 
students who do not have disabilities.78 
Ample room exists for further development of the as-
adequately-met standard and its application both in cases seeking 
damages and in those seeking prospective relief.  Courts appear to be 
edging towards drawing the comparison with services provided 
                                                          
75 Id. at *8. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at *9.  A lesser showing might be permitted if the plaintiffs 
challenge the implementation of the child’s programs rather than its design.  See 
Wiles v. Dep’t of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1158 (D. Haw. 2008) (permitting 
section 504 claim based on implementation of program to proceed). 
78 M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 830261, at *8.   
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children without disabilities that the regulation’s language requires.  
As my earlier work sought to demonstrate, this comparison is well 
within hearing officers’ and courts’ competence, and will require that 
those school districts that provide adequate services to students 
without disabilities provide adequate services to those with 
disabilities as well.  Thus, districts that furnish high quality or top-of-
the-line services to non-disabled students will have a 
commensurately higher obligation to students with disabilities.79 
 
B.   Cases Equating Section 504-ADA and IDEA Obligations 
 
Numerous cases state that if a claim under IDEA fails, the 
court may dismiss a claim under section 504 based on the same 
facts.80  With respect, I submit that the statement is incorrect.  The 
only bases for such a statement would be: (1) IDEA remedies are 
exclusive and supplant those under section 504; (2) a section 504 
regulation provides that “[i]mplementation of an Individualized 
Education Program developed in accordance with [IDEA] is one 
means of meeting the [as-adequately-met] standard,”81 so compliance 
with IDEA is sufficient; and (3) the as-adequately-met regulation 
                                                          
79 See Weber, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
80 E.g., Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(dismissing claims under § 1983, section 504, and title II in dispute over failure to 
provide adaptive physical education to child); Seladoki v. Bellaire Local Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ., No. C2-07-1272, 2009 WL 4884199, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2009) 
(holding that when IDEA claim for denial of appropriate education failed, claim 
under section 504 and ADA for denial of appropriate education failed as well); 
Emily Z. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 06-442, 2007 WL 3174027, at 
*4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2007) (granting summary judgment for school district on 
section 504 and ADA claims on ground they were derivative of IDEA violation 
claims); see Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 257 F. App’x 335 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’g 
No. 06-cv-317-JD, 2007 WL 268947 (D.N.H. Jan. 29, 2007) (dismissing damages 
claims under IDEA and Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, claims for 
retaliation and coercion under ADA and claims based on failure to follow proper 
procedures under section 504 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on ground that claims 
presented IDEA-based claims in guise of ADA claims).  But see Edwards v. 
Fremont Pub. Schs., 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 903 (D. 
Neb. 1994) (finding argument that IDEA is exclusive remedy to be frivolous); 
Hebert v. Manchester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 833 F. Supp. 80, 81 (D. N.H. 1994) 
(denying motion to dismiss section 504 claim that overlapped with claim under 
IDEA). 
81 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2) (2012). 
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does not mean what it says.  The first proposition is patently false.82  
The second proposition is somewhat more plausible, but as I have 
argued elsewhere, the one-means-of-meeting regulation is most 
sensibly read to be referring only to the mechanisms and procedures 
of IDEA, not the Rowley standard for appropriate education;83 
otherwise the as-adequately-met regulation is rendered surplusage in 
the common case in which a child is covered by both IDEA and 
section 504.84  The third proposition works only if one ignores the 
language of the regulation, which is not what hearing officers and 
courts interpreting the law ought to do.  As indicated above, that 
reading is contrary to the recent, well-considered interpretations in 
the Mark H. opinions and M.M. 
 
C.   Cases Requiring Intent 
 
Many cases also state that a showing of intent or something 
like it—a showing of gross misjudgment or bad faith conduct, or one 
of deliberate indifference—is needed to support a claim under section 
504 and the ADA for a child with disabilities in an education case.85  
On closer examination, however, it emerges that the courts are 
discussing damages claims, and base their conclusions on the caselaw 
interpreting title VI of the Civil Rights Act86 and title IX of the 
Education Amendments,87 which are worded similarly to section 504, 
                                                          
82 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under 
the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children 
with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws 
seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under 
[IDEA] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action 
been brought under this subchapter.”); Weber, supra note 5, at 19–20. 
83 See supra note 48–50 and accompanying text (describing Rowley 
standard). 
84 See Weber, supra note 5, at 20–21. 
85 See, e.g., Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 
2000); Smith v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999); Sellers v. 
Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 441 
(5th Cir. 1984); Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982). 
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2006). 
87 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2006). 
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and for which a private right of action exists only for intentional 
discrimination, with damages as the usual remedy.88  The comparison 
of section 504 to these two statutes is not very apt, at least when 
considering claims for anything other than damages relief.  As I have 
emphasized in earlier writing, section 504 differs from title VI and 
title IX in being intended to cover at least some disparate impacts 
(that is, non-intentional conduct); the ADA clearly addresses 
disparate impacts.89  Moreover, both section 504 and the ADA forbid 
failure to provide reasonable accommodations, something that is 
obviously intentional90 but perhaps does not match the mens rea that 
courts considering title VI and title IX cases are talking about when 
they discuss intent.  In any instance, whatever mens rea might be 
required for a damages claim does not matter if the claim is for 
prospective or other equitable relief.91 
Courts have recently acknowledged that intent or proxies for 
intent will not be required in all section 504 and ADA cases 
regarding children with disabilities in public schools.  A 2010 
decision from the Northern District of Illinois relied on Seventh 
Circuit precedent92 interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alexander v. Choate93 to conclude that an individual may show 
exclusion or discrimination in violation of the ADA with “evidence 
(1) the school acted intentionally on the basis of the disability; (2) the 
school refused to provide a reasonable modification; or (3) a rule 
                                                          
88 See, e.g., Scokin, 723 F.2d at 441. 
89 See Weber, supra note 5, at 18–19 (collecting and discussing 
authorities). 
90 See Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 938 (“[Section] 504 itself prohibits actions 
that deny disabled individuals ‘meaningful access’ or ‘reasonable accommodations’ 
for their disabilities.”); Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 
(5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] cause of action is stated under section 504 when it is alleged 
that a school district has refused to provide reasonable accommodations for the 
handicapped plaintiff to receive the full benefits of the school program.”) . 
91 Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 938 (“For purposes of determining whether a 
particular regulation is ever enforceable through the implied right of action 
contained in the statute, the pertinent question is simply whether the regulation falls 
within the scope of the statute’s prohibition.  The mens rea necessary to support a 
damages remedy is not pertinent at that stage of the analysis.”).  
92 Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th 
Cir. 1999). 
93 469 U.S. 287, 295–97 (1985). 
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disproportionally impacts the disabled.”94  The court said that the 
relevant question was whether the denial of services to the child 
“affected [the child’s] access to education in relation to nondisabled 
students.”95  The court declined to apply any standard of bad faith or 
gross misjudgment.96  Ultimately, however, the court granted 
summary judgment for the public school system, ruling that none of 
the services the student alleged he had been denied contributed to his 
failure at school.97  The court said that the child’s removal from a 
general education English class to a self-contained class for special 
education students, when he could have participated in the general 
education class with accommodations, could present a valid claim, 
but the claim was not properly exhausted through the administrative 
process.98 
 
D.   Additional Substantive Educational Obligations 
 
There are additional educational obligations that section 504 
and the ADA impose on public schools.  These duties include 
avoiding the exclusion99 of children with disabilities from school, 
                                                          
94 Brown v. Dist. 299-Chicago Pub. Schs., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083–84 
(N.D. Ill. 2010). 
95 Id. at 1084. 
96 Id. at 1085 n. 8. 
97 Id. at 1085. 
98 Id.; see also MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND 
LITIGATION TREATISE  § 21.6(3) (2008 & Supp.  II 2012)  (collecting cases 
upholding section 504 and ADA title II liability without requiring showing of 
intent). 
99 Bess v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A. 2:08-CV-01020, 2009 
WL 3062974 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2009) (upholding section 504 and ADA 
claims based on school district inducing parents to keep their child with disabilities 
home from school); B.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. CIV 08-00356 DAEB-MK, 2009 
WL 1978184 (D. Haw. July 7, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment in claim that state rule prohibiting children with disabilities from 
continuing special education services after reaching age twenty when general 
education students face no such prohibition violates IDEA and section 504); K.F. v. 
Francis Howell R-III Sch. Dist., No. 4:07 CV 01691 ERW, 2008 WL 723751 (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 17, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss complaint requesting damages and 
compensatory education in suit brought under section 504 and ADA over practice 
of school for two years to dismiss student with disabilities three hours earlier than 
students without disabilities on Wednesday of each week). 
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establishing protection against harassment on the basis of 
disability,100 and avoiding segregation of children with disabilities.101  
Section 504 and the ADA also offer protection for children in the 
student disciplinary process.102  The classic case from the courts of 
appeals requiring that children with disabilities be afforded special 
rights with regard to school discipline is S-1 v. Turlington.103  In S-1, 
the court relied on section 504 as well as the statute that is now IDEA 
in holding that a student with a disability may not be expelled for 
misconduct that results from the child’s disability, and that before 
any expulsion “a trained and knowledgeable group of persons must 
determine whether the student’s misconduct bears a relationship to 
his” or her disability.104  The court held that the right to manifestation 
review is necessarily entailed by the duty not to discriminate on the 
ground of disability.105  The principles that S-1 established continue 
to be vital.106  In N.T. v. Baltimore City Board of School 
                                                          
100 Enright v. Springfield Sch. Dist., No. 04-CV-1653, 2007 WL 4570970 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2007) (denying renewed motion for directed verdict and new 
trial in action ending in $400,000 verdict against a school district over exposure of 
seven-year-old child with ADHD and Asperger’s syndrome to indecent display and 
other sexual conduct and language on school bus, upholding claims under IDEA, 
ADA, and section 504); see Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public 
Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1079, 1093–1110 (2002) (collecting cases). 
101 L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (denying 
motion to dismiss claims based on section 504 and state law as well as class claims 
based on IDEA when parents of triplets alleged that school district automatically 
denied applied behavioral analysis services to children with autism, segregating 
them in insular private school). 
102 See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions Under 
Section 504: A Comparative Overview, 226 ED. LAW. REP. 9 (2008) (discussing 
disciplinary process protections); Perry A. Zirkel, Discipline Under Section 504 
and the ADA, 146 ED. LAW. REP. 617 (2000) (discussing disciplinary process 
protections).  
103 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981).  
104 Id. at 350.  The court’s reliance on section 504 was essential to the 
holding, given that at least some of the plaintiffs in the case were expelled before 
the effective date of the predecessor of IDEA.  See id. at 344, 350. 
105 Id. at 346. 
106 Additional cases upholding rights in the school disciplinary process 
under section 504 include: Dean v. Sch. Dist., 615 F. Supp. 2d 63 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(upholding right to notice concerning expulsion under IDEA and section 504); 
M.G. v. Crisfield, 547 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D.N.J. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss 
Section 1983 procedural due process claim and section 504 claim based on 
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Commissioners, a 2011 case, the court held that allegations about  a 
manifestation meeting that was held without advance notice to the 
parent and at which the child was not permitted to say anything or 
given other basic procedural rights stated a valid section 504 
claim.107 
 
III.  PROCEDURES UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE ADA 
 
IDEA contains an elaborate mechanism for resolving 
disputes, including the perhaps optimistically named “due process 
hearing,”108 as well as rights to obtain independent educational 
evaluations,109 to keep the child in the child’s current educational 
placement during the pendency of proceedings,110 and to be 
represented by counsel or others, present evidence, and confront, 
cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses at the 
hearing.111  The section 504 regulation on the subject is much less 
specific, but requires public elementary and secondary education 
providers to afford children who need or are believed to need special 
education due to disability “a system of procedural safeguards that 
includes notice, an opportunity . . . to examine relevant records, an 
impartial hearing with opportunity for participation by the person’s 
parents or guardian and representation by counsel, and a review 
procedure.”112  Although the section 504 regulation states that 
voluntarily affording the safeguards provided in IDEA satisfies the 
                                                          
discrimination against person regarded as having disability in case of third-grader 
suspended indefinitely for misconduct, whose parents alleged that defendants 
conditioned continued educational services on their consent to accepting placement 
in special education school for child in another district).  See generally Perry A. 
Zirkel, Discipline Under Section 504 and the ADA, 146 ED. LAW. REP. 617 (2000) 
(collecting Office for Civil Rights decisions in complaints concerning discipline). 
107 N.T. v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. JKB–11–356, 2011 WL 
3747751, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2011).  The court applied a bad faith or gross 
misjudgment standard.  Id.  See generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504: 
STUDENT ISSUES, LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
18–19 (2005) (discussing procedural issues in section 504 disciplinary matters). 
108 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006). 
109 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2012). 
110 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006). 
111 See id. § 1415(h)(2). 
112 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2010). 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
632 
obligations imposed by section 504,113 the regulation nowhere 
requires identical procedures.  School districts may, if they choose, 
establish a hearing system different from that which applies to IDEA 
disputes.  Indeed, IDEA hearing officers in a number of jurisdictions 
lack the authority to entertain section 504 claims.114 
Given the bare-bones language of the section 504 regulation, 
it makes sense to ask whether some basic procedural safeguards may 
be imposed either by implication or by the operation of other legal 
authority.  These guarantees might include: the right to a service plan 
or other document constituting a final offer of services, which may be 
used as the basis for a hearing request; impartiality rights, including 
prohibition of service by officials of neighboring school districts or 
state educational agency personnel as hearing officers; rights to 
subpoena witnesses for hearing and to cross-examine witnesses; and 
judicial review. 
 
A.   Service Plans 
 
A major virtue of IDEA’s requirement of an Individualized 
Education Program (IEP) for each child with a disability is that the 
document represents the school district’s final offer of what services 
it will provide to comply with the law’s obligations.  If the parent 
wants more or different services, the IEP is what to challenge.  If the 
parent believes that the school system is not following through on its 
commitments, the IEP is what to compare with the services that are 
actually being delivered.  For children who are served under section 
504 but not IDEA, many school districts create a service plan, which 
fills the same role.  Nevertheless, Professor Zirkel, who has studied 
section 504 extensively, has recently concluded that “[i]n the judicial 
forum, the odds are likely but not certain that the court would rule in 
favor of the defendant school district that does not provide a 504 
                                                          
113 See id.   
114 See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. of Boise City No. 1, 112 LRP 16142 (Idaho 
Educ. Agency 2012) (disavowing authority to hear section 504 claim); Student with 
a Disability, 112 LRP 5356 (N.M. Educ. Agency 2012) (same).  But see Swope v. 
Cent. York Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 2d 592, 602 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“Plaintiff’s 
unsupported statement that hearing officers do not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 
ADA and section 504 claims also fails.  No statutory or case law supports this 
assertion.”). 
    
Fall 2012 Section 504 and ADA Procedures and Remedies  633 
plan.”115  He bases his conclusion on the uncertain status with regard 
to judicial enforceability of the section 504 regulations,116 the 
difficulty with success of a claim on the merits, and the tendency of 
courts to view procedural failings as harmless error.117  As he notes, 
the section 504 regulations do not require a plan, whereas IDEA 
requires one and goes into great detail about its contents.118 
If Professor Zirkel is correct, parents who wish to make 
section 504 claims will face some practical problems pinning down 
the position of the school district when they assert claims at a hearing 
or in court.  They will need to rely on general communications, rather 
than a single document designed to convey clearly what the school 
district believes the child ought to receive under the law.  Cases 
challenging the application of broad policies may benefit from 
reference to public pronouncements or documents obtained from 
Freedom of Information Act requests.  Individual decisions might be 
discerned from the student records that the section 504 regulations 
and various student record laws enable the parents to examine.119  In 
an extreme case, a parent might argue that the school district’s 
decision-making is so opaque or capricious that constitutional due 
                                                          
115 Zirkel, supra note 10, at 414. 
116 Compare Power ex rel. Power v. Sch. Bd., 276 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D. 
Va. 2003) (finding no private right of action to enforce procedural obligations 
imposed by section 504 regulations in school discipline dispute), with J.P.E.H. ex 
rel. Campbell v. Hooksett Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-276-SM, 2007 WL 4893334 
(D.N.H. Dec. 18, 2007) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) 
(permitting service of IDEA claims, section 504 claims, and state law claims 
arising out of alleged failure to provide appropriate IEP to child, failing to properly 
implement IEP by providing required information to and contact with the parent, 
failing to provide impartial due process hearing, and failing to provide sufficient 
notice and hearing or furnish child with advocate before finding the child ineligible 
for continued special education services), aff’d sub nom. Campbell v. Hooksett 
Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 145099 (D.N.H. Jan. 15, 2008).  See generally Weber, supra 
note 5, at 22–23 (questioning persuasiveness of Power’s analysis). 
117 Zirkel, supra note 10, at 414–15. 
118 Zirkel, supra note 10, at 411 (“Conspicuously missing—and fitting 
with a pattern of much more streamlined procedural safeguards of section 504 than 
those of the IDEA—is a 504 plan.  In comparison, the IDEA legislation provides 
not only a definition but multiple pages of requirements for an individualized 
education program (IEP), and the IDEA regulations provide further specifications 
as to its development, contents, and revisions.”) (footnotes omitted). 
119 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2012). 
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process has been violated and that violation may become a claim in 
its own right.120  In any instance, the absence of a service plan creates 
a high risk of confusion if the case gets to hearing and the parent and 
school district dispute what services are actually being offered or 
delivered. 
 
B.   Impartiality of Hearing Officers 
 
The section 504 regulations guarantee an impartial hearing,121 
but say nothing more on the subject.  IDEA, by contrast, provides: 
 
(A) Person conducting hearing.  A hearing officer conducting 
a hearing pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall, at a minimum— 
(i) not be— 
(I) an employee of the State educational agency or the 
local educational agency involved in the education or care 
of the child; or 
(II) a person having a personal or professional interest that 
conflicts with the person's objectivity in the hearing.122 
 
The leading case applying this language, Mayson v. Teague, 
ruled that individuals working for school districts other than the 
district involved in the hearing and the state university personnel 
involved in formulating special education policies for the state could 
not serve as hearing officers.123  The factual history recounted in the 
case showed that after school districts complained to the state 
superintendent about the districts’ negative experiences in due 
process cases, the superintendent began to select hearing panels 
                                                          
120 Cf. White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753–54 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding 
that making welfare eligibility determinations based on unwritten personal 
standards violated due process).  See generally Mark C. Weber, Services for 
Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and 
Procedural Regularity, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 163 (2007) (discussing White’s 
applicability to decisions regarding publicly funded special educational services for 
private school children). 
121 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2012). 
122 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A) (2006). 
123 Mayson v. Teague, 749 F.2d 652 (11th Cir. 1984) 
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predominantly composed of local school system employees.124  The 
court of appeals upheld the district court’s conclusion that employees 
of local school boards other than the one from which the child 
receives services are involved in the education and care of the child, 
in light of the employees’ close connection to the state’s 
administration of educational policy.125  Moreover, the susceptibility 
of all local school personnel to influence and political pressure, even 
when they work for districts other than the one serving the child, 
constituted personal or professional interests conflicting with the 
individuals’ objectivity in the hearing.126  The court also considered 
university personnel who had a role in formulating state policies to 
be involved in the education and care of special education children as 
a group, and found a conflict of interest in the difficulty a person 
formulating a state policy would have in reversing or modifying the 
policy as a hearing officer.127 
Not all courts have gone as far as Mayson in interpreting the 
IDEA provision,128 and the section 504 regulation, of course, lacks 
the IDEA provision’s specificity.  But one needs little imagination to 
conclude that section 504 hearing officers who are employees of 
other school districts, much less those who are employees of the 
district involved in the hearing, lack the independence of thought and 
action to be impartial.  A court has also barred a state superintendent 
of public education from serving as an IDEA hearing officer;129 it 
would be reasonable to conclude that a superintendent or other state 
agency supervisory personnel would lack the necessary independence 
in section 504 cases as well.  Similarly, people who have formulated 
statewide or district-wide policies should not be the ones hearing 
challenges to the policies.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                          
124 Id. at 656. 
125 Id. at 658. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 659. 
128 See L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding 
that employment by district other than one involved in the hearing did not 
disqualify hearing officer); see also Silvio v. Commonwealth, 439 A.2d 893 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982), aff’d 456 A.2d 1366 (Pa. 1983) (finding state university 
personnel in general not disqualified by virtue of employment by state department 
of education). 
129 Robert M. v. Benton, 634 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1980). 
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ruled that a parent had standing to challenge a state procedure by 
which a school board selected an IDEA hearing officer from a list of 
state-certified individuals, and that hearing officer held the hearing 
and made a recommendation to the board.130  The court emphasized 
that, “It is elementary that the provision of a fair hearing before an 
impartial tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” under the 
Constitution, even though the challenge in the case relied solely on 
the statute.131  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights are violated when an adjudicator has 
a stake in the outcome of the case.132  Interests that threaten 
impartiality undermine constitutional due process rights in section 
504 cases, just as they do in cases under IDEA and other laws. 
 
C.   Hearing Rights 
 
The right to subpoena witnesses would appear to be 
fundamental, and is found in IDEA133 and state administrative codes 
applicable to IDEA.134  The same right ought to apply to hearings 
under section 504.  As for presentation of oral testimony and cross 
examination, the very term “hearing” suggests the ability to put 
forward one’s own witnesses and cross-examine opposing witnesses.  
Although these rights are not spelled out in the section 504 
regulations, they should be considered implied.  If there were any 
doubt on the matter, principles of procedural due process under the 
Constitution would call for these rights to be afforded.  In Goldberg 
v. Kelly, the Supreme Court ruled that confronting adverse witnesses 
and presenting one’s own arguments and evidence orally are due 
process minima in the context of termination of welfare benefits.135  
In considering the deprivation of education, “the very foundation of 
good citizenship,” for which “it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
                                                          
130 Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). 
131 Id. at 154. 
132 See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. 
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59–60 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531–33 
(1927). 
133 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2) (2006). 
134 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.660 (2012). 
135 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970). 
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opportunity,”136 the level of procedural due process needs to be 
high.137  It would surely be great enough to compel the same rights 
effective participation in a hearing as found to be required for a pre-
termination welfare eligibility hearing or a claim for relief from being 
required to repay government benefits.138  Cross-examination, “the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,”139 is a 
                                                          
136 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to 
individuals by the Constitution . . . But neither is it merely some governmental 
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.  Both the 
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting 
impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.  The 
‘American people have always regarded education and [the] acquisition of 
knowledge as matters of supreme importance.’  We have recognized ‘the public 
schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government,’ and as the primary vehicle for transmitting ‘the values on which 
our society rests.’  ‘[A]s … pointed out early in our history, ... some degree of 
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently 
in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.’  And 
these historic ‘perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed 
by the observations of social scientists.’  In addition, education provides the basic 
tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit 
of us all.  In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our 
society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when 
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our 
social order rests.”) (citations omitted). 
137 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[I]dentification 
of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.”). 
138 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696–97 (1979) (upholding 
injunction requiring oral hearing in which claimant for waiver of repayment of 
benefits may present testimony and evidence and cross-examine witnesses). 
139 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).  One Department of Education regional office 
letter of finding from 1996 declined to find a violation of section 504 when a 
hearing officer in a section 504 dispute did not allow cross-examination but did 
allow participants to ask follow-up questions and obtain clarification when 
necessary.  Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
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particularly important component of due process when life-altering 
interests are at stake and the risk of erroneous decisions by school 
officials is significant. 
 
D.   Judicial Review 
 
The section 504 regulation requires a “review procedure,” but 
does not specify what that means.  Professor Zirkel and a co-author 
state that this appears to mean judicial review, not an additional 
administrative review, and that the review would be in federal court 
“without the concurrent option of state court.”140  This interpretation 
could be correct, though a Department of Education regulation on 
administrative safeguards would be an odd place to put a grant of 
federal jurisdiction, and the default rule with regard to federal 
jurisdiction is that it is concurrent.141  In any case, there is federal 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for claims that section 504 and 
its regulations have been violated, and a cause of action may be 
found under the statute itself or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so judicial 
review in federal court seems to be a given for the aggrieved child 
and parent acting as next friend.142  Of course, a school district is not 
a person with a disability covered by section 504 or the ADA, and 
there is no explicit conferral of any right to sue on the school district, 
unlike the situation with IDEA.143  Hence, there is no federal law 
basis on which a school district can appeal an unfavorable section 
                                                          
REP. 163 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, S. Div., Dallas 1996).  The 
decision contains no mention of precedent, no discussion of rights in proceedings 
under analogous laws, and no consideration of due process requirements. 
140 Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A Roadmap to Legal Dispute 
Resolution for Students with Disabilities, 23 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 100, 
107 (2010).  The authors cite two administrative decisions considering section 504 
hearing procedures that lack a second level of administrative review.  Since having 
two tiers of administrative review was the dominant practice in the early years of 
the law that is now IDEA, the regulation may well be referring to a second-level 
review, however odd that may seem nowadays. 
141 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990) (noting “deeply rooted 
presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction”). 
142 See Weber, supra note 5, at 22–23 (discussing implied right of action 
under section 504 and explicit cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce 
section 504 procedural safeguards provision).   
143 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006) (“Any party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action . . . .”). 
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504 administrative hearing decision.144 
Judicial review of hearing officer decisions under IDEA is 
highly deferential.  Courts must give due weight to administrative 
rulings when they consider appeals of IDEA cases,145 even though 
the courts are explicitly directed to hear evidence at the request of a 
party.146  The basis for the deferential standard in IDEA cases is that 
the statutory requirement “that the reviewing court ‘receive the 
records of the [state] administrative proceedings’ carries with it the 
implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these 
proceedings.”147  In the absence of any similar statutory requirement 
in section 504, at least one court has held that the ordinary standards 
of summary judgment should apply to section 504 cases, rather than 
the deferential summary judgment or review-on-the-record standards 
ordinarily used by courts in IDEA proceedings.148 
Exhaustion defenses may apply in section 504-ADA actions 
when the relief sought is also available under IDEA,149 and courts 
have been known to require that the factual basis for the specific 
section 504 claim be raised in the administrative proceedings, even 
when the parent is acting pro se.150  Earlier writing of mine takes up 
exhaustion and its exceptions in section 504 cases at some length,151 
                                                          
144 Bd. of Educ. v. Smith, No. Civ. RDB 04-4016, 2005 WL 913119, at *3 
(D. Md. Apr. 20, 2005) (“[W]hile an individual can assert the original jurisdiction 
of this Court on a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the institution alleged to have 
violated the provisions of section 504 cannot directly seek to assert an appeal from 
a decision by a state administrative law judge directly to federal court by asserting 
original jurisdiction.”). 
145 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). 
146 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006). 
147 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. 
148 Bd. of Educ. v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
district court on review of hearing officer decision in section 504-ADA case should 
apply ordinary summary judgment standard rather than deferential standard used in 
IDEA cases). 
149 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006). 
150 Brown v. Dist. 299-Chicago Pub. Schs., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085–
86 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Represented at the hearing by his mother, [plaintiff] need not 
have specifically mentioned the ADA or discrimination at the hearing.  But he was 
required to present the issues underlying his ADA claim so that the hearing officer 
had the opportunity to consider a remedy.”). 
151 See Weber, supra note 5, at 25–26; see also WEBER, supra note 98, § 
21.8 (collecting and analyzing section 504 and ADA cases on exhaustion). 
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and other commentators have weighed in on the topic.152  A major 
recent development requires discussion, however:  the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Payne v. Peninsula School District.153 
In Payne, a damages case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
asserting constitutional violations, the parent alleged that a child with 
autism and motor apraxia was repeatedly locked in a closet-like time 
out room without supervision over the course of a school year.154  
While confined, the child would take off his clothes and would 
urinate and defecate on himself.155  The court overturned the district 
court’s dismissal of the case for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies and remanded.156  The court reexamined the statutory 
provision on which the exhaustion requirement is based, which 
permits claims under the Constitution, section 504, and the ADA, but 
says that “before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking 
relief that is also available under [IDEA], the [due process hearing] 
procedures . . . shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be 
required had the action been brought under [IDEA].”157  The court 
ruled that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional158 and, 
following the language of the statute, held that “[n]on-IDEA claims 
that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not subject to the 
exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could 
conceivably have been redressed by the IDEA.”159  The court 
overruled earlier cases using an “injury-centered approach,” and 
adopted a “relief-centered approach.”160  Instead of treating the IDEA 
section as “a quasi-preemption provision, requiring administrative 
exhaustion for any case that falls within the general ‘field’ of 
                                                          
152 See, e.g., Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ 
Misinterpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by 
Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by 
the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259 (2011). 
153 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 11-539, 2012 WL 538336 
(U.S. 2011). 
154 Id. at 866. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 884. 
157 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006). 
158 Payne, 653 F.3d at 870. 
159 Id. at 871. 
160 Id. at 874. 
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educating disabled students,”161 a court should look “[at the] prayer 
for relief and determine whether the relief is also available under the 
IDEA.”162 
According to the court, exhaustion would be required in three 
instances: first, when the “plaintiff seeks an IDEA remedy or its 
functional equivalent,” such as a tuition reimbursement case, even if 
brought under the ADA rather than IDEA; second, when the plaintiff 
seeks prospective relief to alter an IEP or educational placement even 
if the remedy is sought under a statute other than IDEA; and third, 
when the plaintiff “is seeking to enforce rights that arise as a result of 
a denial of a free appropriate public education, whether pled as an 
IDEA claim or any other claim that relies on the denial of a FAPE to 
provide the basis for the cause of action,” such as a section 504 
damages claim “premised on a denial of a FAPE.”163  The court 
rejected its previous distinction between cases alleging physical 
injuries and those alleging non-physical injuries.164  It also said that 
damages should not be assumed to be equivalent to enhanced 
services that might be available in an IDEA proceeding.165  “If the 
measure of a plaintiff’s damages is the cost of counseling, tutoring, 
or private schooling—relief available under the IDEA—then the 
IDEA requires exhaustion.”166  But “a plausible claim for damages 
unrelated to the deprivation of a FAPE” does not need exhaustion.167 
In general, claims independent of IDEA do not require 
exhaustion: “If a complaint can stand on its own without reference to 
the IDEA, it is difficult to see why the IDEA should compel its 
dismissal.”168  The court said that “[t]he fact that the plaintiff could 
have added IDEA claims to an otherwise sound complaint (and thus 
subjected themselves to the exhaustion requirement), but chose not 
to, should not detract from the viability of that complaint.”169  The 
                                                          
161 Id. at 875. 
162 Id. 
163 Payne, 653 F.3d at 875. 
164 Id. at 876.  
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 877. 
167 Id. 
168 Payne, 653 F.3d at 879. 
169 Id. 
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nature of the complaint in Payne, one of excessive force in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, seems to stand well apart from a claim for 
deprivation of appropriate education under IDEA.  By contrast, some 
section 504 and ADA cases brought by parents of children who are 
eligible under IDEA might fall under the exhaustion requirement if 
they are seeking educational services that IDEA might provide, or 
reimbursement for obtaining those services on the private market.  
Further developments will be needed to outline the precise contours 
of Payne’s rule in cases brought under section 504 and IDEA.  But 
the rule seems plainly to provide a smaller reach for the exhaustion 
defense than had been the case under previous interpretations. 
Of course, Payne does nothing to undermine, and appears to 
reinforce, the conclusion that if the child is by the school district’s 
own admission not eligible for services under IDEA, exhaustion is 
not required.170  If the child is not eligible under IDEA, the relief 
sought is not available under that statute.  Moreover, if a hearing is 
sought but refused in a section 504 case, exhaustion should be 
excused on the ground of futility.171 
 
IV.  REMEDIES 
 
Remedies in section 504-ADA cases involving the education 
of children with disabilities might include compensatory damages, 
tuition reimbursement, orders for future conduct, and ancillary relief 
such as attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees. 
 
                                                          
170 See Weber, supra note 5, at 26; Zirkel, supra note 10, at 414 n. 42 
(“[T]he exhaustion language is within the IDEA and arguably only applies to 
students double-covered by the IDEA and Section 504.”); Maher, supra note 152, 
at 299 (“[Courts] erroneously have required parents to exhaust their Section 
504/ADA claims under the IDEA’s due process procedures even when a student is 
not eligible for services under IDEA.”); see also D.R. v. Antelope Valley Union 
High Sch. Dist., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Thus, in fact and 
law, Plaintiff is not a child with disability as defined under IDEA or an individual 
with exceptional needs as defined under the [California] Education Code.  Since 
Plaintiff is not eligible for relief under IDEA, she does not need to administratively 
exhaust her remedies to assert claims under Section 504, the ADA, and the Unruh 
Act.”). 
171 McNeal v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 3:11–cv–00498–J–32MCR, 2011 
WL 6010293, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2011). 
    
Fall 2012 Section 504 and ADA Procedures and Remedies  643 
A.   Compensatory Damages 
 
At least in cases of intentional conduct, or conduct that meets 
gross misjudgment, bad faith, or deliberate indifference standards, 
compensatory damages are available for violations of section 504 and 
the ADA.172  This conclusion is unsurprising.  Section 504 adopts the 
remedies available under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,173 
and title II of the ADA adopts the remedies available under section 
504.174  The Supreme Court has upheld damages awards under title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,175 which the Court 
interprets consistently with title VI of the Civil Rights Act.176  The 
Court said that under title IX, damages are available “where a 
funding recipient intentionally violates the statute.”177  Applying this 
principle to peer sexual harassment, the Court held that school 
districts may be liable for damages on the basis of a violation of title 
IX if the district administrator or administrators are deliberately 
indifferent to known conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to 
deprive the victim of equal access to an educational program or 
activity. 178 
As noted above, the reach of section 504 and the ADA is 
broader than that of title VI and title IX, which have been read to 
embrace only intentional discrimination.  Instead, section 504 and 
ADA title II forbid at least some disparate impacts and require the 
provision of accommodations.179  Accordingly, the title VI and title 
                                                          
172 See, e.g., M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 
2003); Miles v. Cushing Pub. Schs., No. CIV-06-1431-D, 2008 WL 4619857 
(W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008). 
173 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (adopting remedies under Civil Rights Act title 
VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7).  
174 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006). 
175 Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1992) 
(construing Education Amendments title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2006)).  
176 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“[T]he court has 
interpreted Title IX consistently with Title VI . . . .”). 
177 Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999).  The 
Court suggested the use of a similar test for teacher sexual harassment of students 
in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998). 
178 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 89–98 (discussing analogy to title 
VI and title IX). 
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IX precedent should not necessarily be read to restrict damages 
awards under section 504 and title II to the intentional discrimination 
situations covered by a title VI-title IX analogy.180  At the minimum, 
however, damages should be available for conduct that manifests 
deliberate indifference or otherwise indicates intent.181 
Hearing officers may view entry of a damages award in a 
section 504 proceeding as beyond their authority.182  If hearing 
officers in section 504 cases are thought not to have that power, 
there may arise a situation rather like that regarding attorneys’ fees 
under IDEA, where the hearing officer awards whatever relief is 
within his or her authority and the prevailing claimant then files an 
action for the additional relief available from a court.183 
 
B.   Tuition Reimbursement and Orders for Future Conduct 
 
Relief other than compensatory damages ought to be as 
extensive under section 504 and the ADA as under IDEA, and 
accordingly should embrace reimbursement awards for tuition and 
privately obtained related services, orders for future conduct, records 
amendment orders, and the like.  In Lyons v. Smith, the District of 
Columbia district court reversed a decision by a hearing officer 
refusing to exercise authority to order a placement for a child upon a 
finding that the school system failed to meet section 504 
                                                          
180 See generally Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: 
Discriminatory Intent as a Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1121 (2000) (contending that proof of intent should not be required in 
ADA cases). 
181 See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 939 (9th Cir. 2008).  
Although the Supreme Court disallowed punitive damages as a remedy under ADA 
title II in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002), the Court did nothing to 
challenge the proposition that compensatory damages are available, and left 
undisturbed the $1 million compensatory award in that case. 
182  This appears to be the conclusion reached in IDEA cases that have 
entertained the possibility of damages relief.  See Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial 
Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act,  31 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 42 (2011) (“Although a 
minority of courts have taken the view that money damages are available under the 
IDEA, it is generally accepted that this form of relief is not within H/ROs’ 
authority.”) (footnotes omitted). 
183 See, e.g., Barlow-Gresham Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 
940 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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requirements.184  Other courts have ordered or upheld orders for 
ongoing educational services, compensatory education, and similar 
remedies in section 504 or ADA cases.185 
 
C.   Attorneys’ Fees and Expert Witness Fees 
 
Both section 504 and the ADA provide for attorneys’ fees for 
prevailing claimants.  The ADA specifically allows for fees in 
administrative proceedings.186  Section 504’s fees provision states: 
“In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a 
provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”187  This language mimics title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which has been held to permit 
attorneys’ fees for administrative proceedings that must be pursued to 
                                                          
184 Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 419–20 (D.D.C. 1993) (“[T]he 
Court finds that a hearing officer may order [the public school system] to provide 
special education to a student designated as ‘otherwise qualified handicapped’ 
under § 504, but may only do so under appropriate circumstances . . . .  [I]n some 
situations, a school system may have to provide special education to a handicapped 
individual in order to meet the educational needs of a handicapped student ‘as 
adequately as the needs’ of a nonhandicapped student, as required by § 
104.33(b)(1).” (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1016 (1984))). 
185 J.T. v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., No. 4:08CV1431RWS, 2009 WL 
262094, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss claim for 
violation of section 504 and ADA in action over alleged failure to provide 
appropriate education to child in state school, holding that permissible relief could 
include audio-visual monitoring to allow independent parental review of activities 
and monitoring of child’s safety); Neena S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV.A. 
05-5404, 2008 WL 5273546 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2008) (affirming limited award of 
compensatory education for long-term failure to provide appropriate special 
education services); Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV.A. 06-3866, 2008 
WL 191176, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008) (awarding compensatory education 
under IDEA and section 504); Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 931 A.2d 640, 644 
(Pa. 2007) (finding private school child not deemed eligible for services under 
IDEA entitled to occupational therapy services at public school under section 504). 
186 42 U.S.C.A. § 12205 (West 2010) (“In any action or administrative 
proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”). 
187 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (2006). 
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file the claim in court.188  An action may be filed solely for fees after 
the claimant has prevailed in the administrative proceedings.  The 
Supreme Court in a case interpreting the applicable provision from 
title VII stated:  
 
Since it is clear that Congress intended to authorize 
fee awards for work done in administrative 
proceedings, we must conclude that [title VII]’s 
authorization of a civil suit in federal court 
encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of 
attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local 
proceedings.189 
 
The ADA fees provision includes “litigation expenses, and 
costs,”190 which would seem to embrace the fees that parents in 
special education cases frequently need to pay to expert witnesses.  
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that the attorneys’ fees 
provision in IDEA does not cover expert witness fees,191 a court has 
held that the section 504 fees provision extends to those charges.192 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
As more parents turn to section 504 and the ADA in special 
education cases, the administrative law judiciary will face hard 
questions about procedures and remedies under those laws.  This 
Article suggests some answers, applying methods that look to the text 
                                                          
188 N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980). 
189 Id. at 66.  Although the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Act has been held 
not to permit a separate action for attorneys’ fees if the claimant has been 
successful in his or her claim on the merits in administrative proceedings and 
nothing remains to litigate in court, N.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. 
Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 13–15 (1986), the language in that statute is different 
from that of title VII and section 504.  See id. at 13–14. 
190 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006). 
191 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297–
98 (2006). 
192 L.T. ex rel. B.T. v. Mansfield Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 04-1381 (NLH), 
2009 WL 2488181 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009) (disallowing expert witness fees under 
IDEA but allowing expert witness fees under section 504 claim). 
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of the relevant provisions and underlying constitutional principles to 
find a robust set of procedural protections and remedial options. 
